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ABSTRACT 
When applying biometric algorithms to forensic verification, 
false acceptance and false rejection can mean a failure to iden­
tify a criminal, or worse, lead to the prosecution of individuals 
for crimes they did not commit. It is therefore critical that bio­
metric evaluations be performed as accurately as possible to 
determine their legitimacy as a forensic tool. This paper ar­
gues  that,  for forensic verification scenarios,  traditional per­
formance  measures  are insufficiently accurate.  This inaccu­
racy occurs because existing verification evaluations implic­
itly assume that an imposter claiming a false identity would 
claim  a random  identity rather than consciously  selecting  a 
target to impersonate. In addition to describing this new vul­
nerability,  the paper describes a novel Targeted..FAR metric 
that  combines  the traditional False  Acceptance Rate  (FAR) 
measure with a term that indicates how performance degrades 
with the number of potential targets. The paper includes an 
evaluation  of the effects of targeted impersonation on an ex­
isting  academic face verification system. This evaluation re­
veals that even with a relatively small number of targets false 
acceptance rates can increase significantly,  making the anal­
ysed biometric systems unreliable. 
Index  Terms- Forensics,  Face Verification,  Biometric 
Evaluation 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
In  January  2010  Al-Mabhouh,  a  co-founder  of  the military 
wing  of  Hamas  was  assassinated  in  Dubai.  According  to 
Dubai's authorities there are up to 29 suspects,  12 of whom 
carried British passports, six Irish, four French, one German, 
four Australian, and two Palestinian. Interpol and the Dubai 
police believe the suspects stole the identities of real people 
[1]. This example highlights the risk that sophisticated attack­
ers can undermine existing identification systems by targeting 
individuals for impersonation. It is therefore important to ex­
amine the accuracy of biometric tools when subjected to such 
targeted attacks. 
This paper is concerned with the general vulnerability of 
biometric verification to targeted impersonation. Verification 
occurs when a user claims an identity which is then validated 
by comparing a stored biometric signature against their pre­
sented biometric features. Whilst no verification process is in-
fallible, significant progress has been made in improving ver­
ification accuracy and there are now many commercial bio­
metric systems in regular use. However, recent research  [2] 
has shown how these systems may be vulnerable to deliberate 
attempts to subvert them. 
Such attacks are conceptually simple:  they involve find­
ing an existing person with a similar biometric signature and 
then fraudulently assuming that identity to spoof a verifica­
tion check.  Traditionally,  the security of biometric verifica­
tion  has  been measured using  false  acceptance  rates.  This 
provides an estimate of the likelihood that an imposter would 
successfully be accepted by  a biometric system if they  ran­
domly  claimed a false identity.  However,  it does  not accu­
rately measure the vulnerability of such systems to more de­
liberate attacks, which is the focus of this paper. 
Increases  in  the use of  social  networking,  online  dating 
and centralized biometric databases have made identity sys­
tems more vulnerable to targeted attacks. These large search­
able collections of face and other biometric data increase the 
chance  of finding  a  target  that  has  a  closely  matching  bio­
metric signature. Such attacks are particularly dangerous as 
they can be effective both against automated biometrics and 
manual methods of identification, such as visual passport in­
spection. 
The paper  starts  by  surveying  the  existing literature on 
the measurement of biometric vulnerabilities. It then exam­
ines the effect of targeted spoofing on a face verification sys­
tem. The investigation uses a publicly available biometric al­
gorithm and dataset.  The paper then examines  how the ef­
fectiveness of attacks increases with the number of potential 
targets.  It concludes by  proposing  an additional metric for 
verification performance. 
2.  BIOMETRIC VULNERABILITIES 
Technology evaluations of biometric systems primarily mea­
sure  verification  performance  using  the  false  rejection  and 
false acceptance rates of the system under test with different 
trade-off priorities [3]. 
Many contextual factors, such as facial pose and lighting, 
can have a significant effect on verification performance and, 
as  the  various  biometrics  have  matured,  these  factors  have 
been investigated  [4].  More recently, deliberate attempts to 
attack biometric systems have been studied. Uludag et al. [5] 
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of the biometric system being subverted. Attacks from Type 
1 are aimed at the sensor and are the focus of this paper. The 
remaining types are attacks on the electronic systems and en­
rollment procedures used to set up and perform verification. 
In terms  of sensor  level  attacks,  three  existing  methods 
have been identified [6]: 
•  Zero effort attacks, in which a person claims a random 
identity and attempts to be incorrectly accepted by the 
system.  Zero effort  attacks  are  the  attack  type  being 
measured  in  existing  large  scale  performance  evalua­
tions that calculate false accept rates. 
•  Bruteforce attacks, which repeatedly attempt to access 
a  system,  adjusting  a  biometric  feature  until  a  suffi­
ciently close match is obtained [7].  Such attacks gener­
ally require unrestricted access to the biometric system 
(e. g. picking a biometric lock on a stolen laptop). Se­
cure access control scenarios, such as passport control 
at an airport, make such attacks less feasible as access 
failures can raise alarms. 
•  Artifact attacks, which use a synthetic biometric feature 
that has been produced from a genuine user. Such at­
tacks would also cover the attempted use of a surgically 
removed biometric features and methods which exploit 
residual features on a sensor [8]. 
An additional consideration is that not all the users of a 
system will necessarily have the same level of security. This 
was highlighted by Doddington et al. [9], who measured the 
relative recognizability of different users of a speaker recog­
nition system. Here users were classified into four different 
types:  sheep  who have normal performance,  goats  who are 
difficult to recognize, lambs who are easy to impersonate and 
wolves who can easily impersonate others. Attackers can ex­
ploit this variation to compromise a biometric system. For ex­
ample, a lamb insertion attack [6] would involve deliberately 
enrolling a person or synthetic feature that is known to have a 
similar signature to many subjects. The system containing the 
lamb subject would then be vulnerable to imposters claiming 
the lamb identity. 
By  deliberately  selecting  a  legitimate  user  with  similar 
biometric  features,  a  targeted  attack  can  turn  any  imposter 
into a wolf subject. Targeted attacks are a significant vulner­
ability as they have no artificial traits that can be recognized, 
either by an automated system or a human supervisor. They 
are also possible without control over the enrollment proce­
dure or the need for a confederate whose true identity would 
be made known, as is the case for twin impersonation or lamb 
injection attacks. Such attacks are also quite likely,  as they 
are a plausible strategy for even relatively unsophisticated at­
tackers. 
3.  IMPACT EVALUATION 
This  section  evaluates  the  effects  of  targeted  attacks  on the 
CSU Baseline Algorithm developed by Bohne et al. [10] for 
the Good,  the Bad and the Ugly  face recognition challenge 
[11].  The  system  has  been  trained  using  images  from  the 
NIST Multiple Biometric Grand Challenge dataset [12]. The 
verification system has partial robustness to lighting variation, 
expression changes and occlusions. However, its performance 
is much lower than has been demonstrated with state-of-the­
art commercial face verification algorithms  [3]. The system 
was evaluated using the Color FERET face database,  which 
has been available since 1996. The frontal face subset, con­
sisting of files labeled Fa  and Fb,  has been selected as it is 
more representative of relatively controlled face  verification 
recordings and is consistent with the original FERET verifi­
cation testing protocol  [13]. The dataset is made up of 1009 
subjects of varying age, sex and race. The evaluation assumes 
the attacker has complete access to the gallery of subjects and 
the verification algorithms used by the system. In each case, 
half of the recordings of each subject are randomly selected 
and used as the gallery to which the attacker has access. 
Each subject in the gallery takes the role of an attacker. 
In each case the gallery data is analyzed to select a target that 
the attacker will impersonate. In all of the targeted attacks, a 
target was chosen based on the best match score value of all 
of the possible combinations of attacker and target recordings 
within the gallery.  The non-gallery recordings of the target 
are then compared against the attacker to determine imposter 
scores.  Score values are also calculated for all the true match­
ing pairs of users of the system. These score values are used 
to produce DET curves showing the trade-off of false accept 
and false reject rates for different verification thresholds.  A 
traditional  zero-effort  DET  curve  is  also  produced  to  show 
the relative effect of targeted attacks. The curve is calculated 
by comparing each of the excluded recordings against each of 
the gallery recordings to produce a range of scores for both 
legitimate and zero-effort attacks. It is expected that real de­
ployments may have more challenging input data and in turn 
may have more sophisticated verification systems;  however, 
the experiments indicate that the relative effect of targeting is 
sufficient to warrant further investigation. 
Figure 1 shows the baseline zero effort attack DET curve 
and the False Acceptance Rates when targeting is applied at 
the baseline EER threshold value.  The EER of the baseline 
is  17%.  However,  when  a  targeted  attack  is performed  on 
the same system the false acceptance rate rises to 51  %, three 
times the original value and a significant security risk. If the 
threshold of the system is selected with the knowledge of tar­
geted attacks, the EER becomes 28%, which reduces the risk 
but increases the false reject rate to an impractical level. 3.1.  Number of Targets 
In the baseline experiments the number of targets available to 
the attacker is necessarily restricted by the size of the datasets. 
The size of these data  sets  is  consistent  with the number  of 
subjects that might access a secure office environment but is 
much lower than many important identity scenarios such as 
passport  control.  To analyze the  effect  of increasing  target 
numbers, further experiments were performed using the Face 
verification  system.  800  gallery  subsets  of  increasing  size 
were created. These subsets were used in the selection of tar­
gets for evaluation. To minimize any potential bias caused by 
subset selection, for a given size, all non-overlapping subsets 
within  the  first 800 subjects  were combined to produce av­
erage false accept rates across the different subsets. This en­
sures that a subset size of 1 is virtually identical to the baseline 
performance. All gallery members took the role of attackers 
using the subset to generate the imposter scores. 
Figure 2 indicates how the false accept rate increases as 
the size of the target subset increases. The graph shows the 
false acceptance rate for a threshold that achieves the equal er­
ror rate of the baseline system under zero effort attacks. This 
is a plausible threshold for systems that are unaware of  the 
risks of targeted attacks.  As the number of available targets 
increases, the number of possible subsets decreases, increas­
ing the error in the measured false accept rate. Much of the 
curve, however,  conforms reasonably well to a least squares 
fit of an a.log(x) + b model, with a  =  5.2 and b  =  16.7. 
One difficulty with using a logarthmic fit to predict FAR 
is that such a curve will produce values bellow 0% and above 
lOO%.  Although FAR values are limited in this way, the dif­
ference between individual biometric signatures may not be. 
There are many different score distributions that could pro­
duce 0% or lOO% FAR values based on the relative difference 
between legitimate and imposter score  values.  As  such  the 
logarithmic fit can be seen as expressing the functional shift 
in the difference between legitimate and imposter score distri­
butions rather than the FAR value itself. As the FAR measure­
ments approach the bounds, excessively distant or close score 
values  will have a diminished effect on the measured FAR. 
One way to understand  this effect is to treat the logarithmic 
prediction as the centre of a probability distribution over FAR 
values that can pass outside of the bounds. This probability 
distribution reflects the likelihood of obtaining any particular 
FAR when the biometric system is evaluated. When determin­
ing the liklihood of  lOO% or 0% FAR values the entire prob­
ability  distribution  outside of the bounds  are  combined.  In 
practice this means that when the targeted FAR value reaches 
lOO%,  the model predicts that there is a 50% chance of ob­
taining  lOO%  FAR  for  any  given  evaluation  of  the  system. 
Further research is required to determine the shape of this dis­
tribution and to validate these predictions on systems which 
reach these bounds. 
The fitted model can be used to provide estimates of the 
False Rejection Rate [in %] 
Fig. 1.  The effects of a targeted attack on the CSU face verifi­
cation algorithm. Baseline shows the performance of the sys­
tem under a zero effort attack.  Targeted shows the increase 
under targeted biometric attacks. 
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Fig.  2.  The effect of target numbers on FAR with a verifica­
tion threshold set at the EER of the baseline system. 
number  of  targets  needed  to  achieve  different  false  accept 
rates. For example, using this model, approximately 200,000 
targets are required for an 80% FAR, 1,370,000 for 90% and 
9,500,000 for  lOO%.  Larger evaluations are needed to con­
firm these predictions. However, they suggest that for national 
identity applications with many millions of subjects, such as 
passport control, there is a greater than 50% chance that this 
verification system could be subverted by any user. 
An additional consideration is how feasible is it for attack­
ers  to obtain information about the gallery subjects and the 
system being attacked. For small scale deployments, surveil­
lance  may  be  sufficient  to  establish possible  targets.  How-ever, some biometrics may be more vulnerable. For example, 
face, voice and gait are relatively easy to record at a distance 
while fingerprint, iris and finger vein may require more elab­
orate social engineering to obtain.  For identity applications 
with a large number of users, such as passports, public infor­
mation may be sufficient.  For example,  a number of online 
dating websites have photographs of millions of users which 
can be anonymously searched using soft biometric constraints 
including, age, sex, race, hair color and height [14]. Central­
ized  databases  of  biometric  information  are  of greater con­
cern.  For example,  if the US Visit database was hacked,  its 
recordings could be used to identify possible targets for face 
or fingerprint attacks. 
4.  CONCLUSION 
This paper analyses the effect of targeted attacks,  which can 
reduce the effectiveness of biometric identity  verification. It 
illustrated the problem through the evaluation of a face base­
line verification algorithm, revealing that with  800 potential 
targets,  attacks can increase false acceptance rates by a fac­
tor of three, reducing security to the point that it is no longer 
reliable for forensic  identification.  Further  analysis suggests 
that the false acceptance rate can be estimated using a sim­
ple model that is proportional to the logarithm of the number 
of  enrolled  subjects.  This  model  provides a  means  to  esti­
mate the vulnerability of systems with many users and shows 
that for the face verification algorithm analyzed here, national 
identity schemes could be unreliable under these attacks. 
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